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“Tangible Things: The Matter of Susan Howe” examines materiality in two books, That 
This (2010) and Debths (2017), by the contemporary American experimental poet Susan Howe. 
More specifically, this examination finds a double movement in both collections between 
foregrounding the materiality of writing and of the text and meditating on the vibrant nature of 
matter itself. To frame the first part of this double movement, the thesis draws on recent digital 
humanities scholarship from Matthew Kirschenbaum and Johanna Drucker that highlights the 
technologically and materially mediated nature of writing processes and the texts they produce. 
Then, to frame the second part, it explores Jane Bennett’s new materialism, particularly its claim 
that all human and nonhuman matter coalesce into assemblages thereby displaying and 
developing an immanent “thing-power.” Within Howe’s work, both parts of this double 
movement play off of each other. Her books use prose, verse, and visual design to announce their 
materialities in order to articulate an ontological claim about matter. That This contains details of 
Howe’s archival research, minimalist page layouts, and clashing word collages. These elements 
certainly underscore the physicality of her medium; they also accentuate her recollections of her 
deceased husband and the manner in which the things she had long associated with him channel 
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and conduct those recollections. Meanwhile, Debths includes odes to Howe’s most beloved 
editions and similarly minimalist page layouts and clashing word collages. These features again 
emphasize the materiality of her work; simultaneously, they amplify her claim that nonhuman 
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I. Introduction 
 While Susan Howe has written experimental poetry for nearly five decades now, she was 
once a different type of experimental artist. Throughout the 1960s, she was an abstract 
expressionist painter and part of New York’s downtown arts scene. Her transformation from 
painter to poet, in fact, did not begin until she and her second husband, David von Schlegell, had 
decamped to Guilford, Connecticut in 1972. Von Schlegell had accepted a position in sculpture 
at Yale University’s School of Art, but Howe still seemed drawn to Manhattan. As she explains 
in a 2005 interview in Free Verse, she returned to the city weekly during that time, subletting 
studio space from the painter Marcia Hafif on Crosby Street in SoHo. In the early 1970s, Hafif 
had immersed herself in a project that involved covering notebook pages, from top to bottom and 
from side to side, with words. Howe soon immersed herself in a similar project. Cutting the 
names of plants, birds, boats, and other things from newspapers and magazines, she arranged and 
rearranged these fragments in her own five-by-six-inch black notebooks (Free Verse). (Howe has 
used these same notebooks throughout her career; visitors to Yale’s Beinecke Library can 
request and view many of them, which contain personal reflections, quotations from various 
philosophers and poets, and, of course, early drafts of her verse [“Susan Howe Papers”].) As she 
filled more and more of these notebooks, Howe realized that her arrangements and 
rearrangements mattered. Margins mattered, line breaks mattered, and the words no longer 
seemed so unrelated (Free Verse). When Ted Greenwald, then the director of a poetry workshop 
at Saint Mark’s Church in Manhattan’s East Village, examined the notebooks, he agreed and 
encouraged Howe to view them less as art objects and more as poetry (Free Verse). By 1974, she 
had indeed regarded this work as poetry and published Hinge Picture, her first collection. 
Although I will not examine Howe’s transformation from painter to poet, or her relationships 
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with experimental artists in 1960s and 1970s New York, or even her first published collection, 
this anecdote highlights two aspects of her work central to this thesis. 
First, it foregrounds how writing always remains a material process and the text always 
remains a material entity. At first glance, both statements might seem obvious—clearly we use 
various analog and digital materials to compose and consume text. That obviousness, however, 
often recedes into forgetfulness. We know that writing on a computer requires glass, metal, 
plastic, and electricity or that a book contains paper, ink, and glue, and because we know this 
those materials evanesce. Howe’s work resists this. Writing, for her, involves both common (pen, 
paper, computer) and uncommon (scissors, copiers, archives) materials. Indeed, her experience 
in Hafif’s loft in the early 1970s prefigures a career where such practices—cutting, copying, and 
arranging fragments—became integral to her writing processes. Simultaneously, Howe’s texts 
never erase the materials from which they emerge but foreground them. Her books employ 
everything from copious white space to word collages to photograms. Again, Howe’s time in that 
SoHo loft seems to prefigure her career as a poet here—those five-by-six-inch black notebooks 
emphasize their constituent materials. The first section of this thesis, “Writing, the Text, and 
Materiality,” explains the importance of these practices. That explanation involves a brief survey 
of some of the basic premises of textual scholarship, including its emphasis on the material 
circumstances of a text’s production. Yet it ultimately examines the work of contemporary 
digital humanists like Matthew Kirschenbaum and Johanna Drucker who extend those basic 
premises to explore writing, the text, and materiality in the context of increasing digital writing 
technologies.   
Second, this anecdote highlights Howe’s preoccupation with the nature of matter itself. 
Cutting the names of plants, birds, boats, and other things from old newspapers and then 
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arranging them in notebooks certainly seems like a textual practice. At the same time, however, 
it also seems like an ontological claim. Bruno Latour, the French philosopher of science, has 
developed something called Actor Network Theory (ANT) throughout his career. Put simply, 
ANT holds that all entities—human and nonhuman alike—interact within networks without rigid 
ontological hierarchies. In Latour’s words, it “reinjects” things—non-sentient objects—into our 
understanding of society by reminding us that we, as humans, are “on par” with all other entities 
(370, 377). The difference between human and nonhuman, then, is one of degree, not kind. 
Howe’s time in Hafif’s loft, spent assembling, arranging, and rearranging many disparate things 
(or text denoting many disparate things), seems to accomplish something similar in its suggestion 
that such entities exist together on a shared plane. And it, too, seems to prefigure a career where 
such assembly, arrangement, and rearrangement of disparate things becomes commonplace in 
her poetry. The second section of this thesis, “The Matter of New Materialism,” frames Howe’s 
preoccupation with matter by exploring Jane Bennett’s new materialism and her discussion of 
the assemblage, a concept initially developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Influenced 
by Latour, Deleuze, Guattari, and many other materialist, monist, and pragmatic thinkers, 
Bennett promotes a flatter ontology where the difference between human and nonhuman blurs. 
Within this ontology, however, agency arises not from one localized, human entity but from 
many distributed, human and nonhuman entities that coalesce into an assemblage. Indeed, within 
this assemblage, all of these entities demonstrate and develop some power. As Bennett suggests, 
if we look closely enough at any productive effect, we will understand that it emerges from the 
grouping of many disparate things. 
 Although Howe displayed her material practices and her preoccupation with matter on 
Crosby Street in the early 1970s, this thesis ultimately examines two of her later works That This 
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(2010) and Debths (2017). In both books, Howe moves between foregrounding the materiality of 
writing and of the text and meditating on the nature of matter itself. Indeed, each movement 
interacts with and plays off the other. The third section of this thesis, “The Double Movements of 
That This and Debths,” explores this in greater detail. The prose, poetry, page layouts, 
photograms, and word collages of That This, for example, ensure that we always register its 
physicality. They attune us to the materials integral to its production, and they remind us of the 
materials that comprise it. Simultaneously, That This makes an ontological claim about matter 
when Howe considers the death of her husband, Peter Hare, through the things she has long 
associated with him. Howe, Hare, and things as variegated as a blue plastic sheath, an oil 
painting, and a desk coalesce into assemblages and produce affecting responses. Debths, 
meanwhile, employs many of the same techniques as That This to call attention to the materiality 
of her medium. Howe’s prose, poetry, page layout, and word collages again remind us not only 
that writing requires many materials, but also that many materials comprise the text itself. This, 
in turn, reinforces an ontological claim similar to the one presented in That This—that human 
and nonhuman things merge into assemblages, demonstrate and develop their power, and 
engender productive effects. Yet Debths accomplishes this by exploring how temporal 
experiences—Howe’s own senses of past, present, and future—remain mediated by things. The 
double movement between materialization and ontological claim, then, exists in both books but 
unfolds in different manners. Four decades after those experiments in Hafif’s loft, Howe remains 
as interested as ever in these topics. 
II. Writing, the Text, and Materiality 
In a 2011 interview with Poets.org, Howe details her writing process for That This. Long 
a lover of libraries and archives, she describes the “thrill” of seeing the eighteenth-century 
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preacher Jonathan Edwards’s manuscripts at the Beinecke Library in 2007. At the time, Howe 
was combing through this collection while preparing an essay on the connections between 
Edwards and the twentieth-century poet Wallace Stevens. By chance, Howe came across a folder 
containing the letters of Hannah Edwards Wetmore, one of Jonathan’s ten sisters. Struck by the 
handwriting and a quotation from psalm 55 (“Oh that I had wings like a dove! [for then] would I 
fly away, and be at rest”), Howe transcribed these manuscripts and returned home (“Open 
Field”). There, she printed the transcriptions and “using multi-purpose copy paper, scissors, 
‘invisible’ scotch tape, and a Canon copier PC170,” she “collaged” fragments of these printed 
transcriptions with fragments of other texts (“Open Field”). This process seems anything but 
straightforward. To write That This, Howe relied on the institutional riches of the Beinecke, the 
eighteenth-century manuscripts of Edwards and his family, her own computer, copy paper, 
scotch tape, a Canon copier PC170, “other texts,” and the various editors, designers, and 
typesetters employed by or through New Directions to transform her vision into a book. This 
short account highlights the complex and material nature of both writing and the text.1 It also 
demonstrates that both Howe’s writing and Howe herself acknowledge—and even emphasize—
that nature (the ironic quotation marks enclosing “invisible,” for example, suggest that writing is 
always visible). But why should we care about the Beinecke, the scotch tape, the Canon copier 
PC170, or New Directions? How does understanding the contexts of a work’s production help us 
understand the work itself? 
Textual scholarship has long argued that we can never fully separate a text from the 
material conditions of its production, and recent digital humanities scholarship has elaborated 
upon this argument. The work of Matthew Kirschenbaum and Johanna Drucker represent two 
                                                      
1 A brief note on terminology: “writing” and “the text” have specific meanings throughout this thesis. Where the 
former refers to the composition process, the latter refers to the product of that process. 
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such examples. In Track Changes: A Literary History of Word Processing (2016), Kirschenbaum 
surveys the development of word processing technologies to examine their effects on writing 
itself. While he refrains from making any sweeping arguments, Kirschenbaum does suggest that 
the widespread adoption of word processing technologies in the late twentieth century neither 
dematerialized nor automated writing. Instead, it introduced new materials (plastic, glass, light, 
electronic bits) and new roles (typist, desktop publisher) into the writing process. Track Changes, 
in other words, remains sensitive to the material and social conditions of that process. New 
digital technologies might seem immaterial and impersonal in our contemporary cultural 
imagination, but they are not. Drucker underscores and extends many of these points. We should, 
in her view, never regard writing as ethereal. Instead, and regardless of media, writing constitutes 
a multifaceted process that involves not only the imaginative capacities of the writer but also the 
material conditions surrounding him or her. Similarly, the text’s meaning and the text’s 
materiality do not exist in separate, independent realms. All of the text’s textual and graphic 
entities (type, margins, trim) form a system through which meaning arises. Kirschenbaum and 
Drucker examine different subjects from different angles here—where Kirschenbaum concerns 
himself with the literary-historical significance of shifting writing technologies, Drucker 
concerns herself with the theoretical implications of the complex and material nature of writing 
and the text. Viewed together, however, they provide some grounding for understanding how, for 
example, textual fragments transcribed, printed, cut, copied, and assembled on a page articulate 
their own materiality and attune us to matter more generally. 
Before going further, I want to contextualize the work of Kirschenbaum and Drucker 
through a short survey of textual scholarship, as both acknowledge its impact on their own 
thought. The opening chapter of Track Changes, for example, remarks that while textual 
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scholarship has devoted little time to word processing, its importance—its emphasis on 
“knowing the material history” of texts—suggests that this will change (26). And Drucker, in her 
2013 essay “What Is Graphic Textuality,” writes that she has recently “come under the influence 
of bibliographical studies and textual theory” (68). What exactly textual scholarship 
constitutes—and where studies of word processing, “bibliographical studies,” and “textual 
theory” fit into textual scholarship—remains contested, though David Greetham has offered 
some explanations. In Textual Scholarship: An Introduction (1994), he argues that “textual 
scholars study process (the historical stages in the production, transmission, and reception of 
texts), not just product (the text resulting from such production, transmissions, and reception)” 
(2). Where other scholars might consider the text at hand, textual scholars consider how that text 
became the text at hand. They historicize it, and they understand the technologies used to 
produce, transmit, and receive it. Indeed, Greetham stresses that textual scholars “must be 
familiar with the technical processes by which documents were created” (4). They study the ink, 
paper, type, binding, and the myriad other details of their production. By emphasizing process 
and product, and by attending to the technicalities of both, textual scholars ultimately aim not 
only to evaluate “the effect of the technical history on the text itself” but also to combine such an 
approach with the critical work central to the humanities (7, 10). They demonstrate, in other 
words, how the text at hand always remains entangled with the historical, material, and social 
contexts of its production, transmission, and reception. 
What does this approach look like in practice, however? Consider the following passage, 
from Jerome McGann’s “The Rationale of Hypertext,” as an example of such textual 
scholarship: 
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It has taken one hundred years for scholars to realize that a typographical edition of 
Dickinson’s writings—whether of her poetry or even her letters—fundamentally 
misrepresents her literary work. A wholesale editorial revaluation of Dickinson is now 
well under way. A particularly telling example appeared recently in an article by Jeanne 
Holland on the Dickinson poem “Alone and in a Circumstance” (J 1167). Holland’s 
facsimile reprint of the poem shows a work structured in a close, even a dialectical, 
relation to its physical materials. 
Dickinson set up a kind of gravitational field for her writing when she fixed an 
uncancelled three-cent stamp (with a locomotive design) to a sheet of paper and then 
wrote her poem in the space she had thus imaginatively created. Whatever this poem 
“means,” the meaning has been visually designed—more in the manner of a painter or a 
graphic artist than in the manner of writers who are thinking of their language in semantic 
or—more generously—linguistic terms. (“Rationale”) 
McGann first stresses that the text, as a specific visual arrangement of disparate materials, 
matters. Indeed, any edition that erases the peculiarities of Dickinson’s textual practices 
“fundamentally misrepresents her work.” Then, he offers a facsimile reprint of “Alone and in a 
Circumstance” as evidence that examining such peculiarities matters a great deal.2 Knowing that 
Dickinson assembled this poem with a “three-cent stamp,” a “sheet of paper,” and a “pen” allows 
us to know much more than any straightforward transcription would. McGann emphasizes that 
whatever meaning the poem has, it emerges from its visual design; the texts and the contexts of 
its composition remained intertwined and codependent. Critics may interpret “Alone and in a 
Circumstance,” but any interpretation that fails to account for the social and material conditions 
                                                      
2 See http://www.themorgan.org/exhibitions/online/emily-dickinson/16 for an image and transcription of this 
facsimile. 
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of its production misses a good deal. McGann’s textual scholarship, and the textual scholarship 
that Greetham surveys, complicates those critical approaches that fail to account for such 
conditions. 
A former student of McGann’s at the University of Virginia, Kirschenbaum extends this 
premise when he suggests that we can never really disentangle writing from writing 
technologies. Yet Track Changes refrains from sweeping arguments about the history of word 
processing and its effects on writing. Writing and writing technologies remain related, but the 
latter does not exert some monolithic, deterministic influence over the former. Kirschenbaum 
writes that “the history I offer here thus largely and willfully resists generalizations and sweeping 
conclusions; it highlights instead the stories of individuals, it pays heed to the difference different 
tools and technologies actually make, and it reveals how the attitudes and assumptions can 
sometimes change over the span of even just a few years” (30). This literary history, in other 
words, does not provide a grand meta-narrative but presents individual narratives, delineates 
different technologies, clarifies their different effects, and historicizes changing “attitudes and 
assumptions.” The evidence, in fact, seems to support this willful resistance to “generalizations 
and sweeping conclusions.” Indeed, Kirschenbaum reveals both his own impulse to make such 
overarching claims and their own shortcomings: “Every impulse that I had to generalize about 
word processing—that it made books longer, that it made sentences shorter, that it made 
sentences longer, that it made authors more prolific—was seemingly countered by some equally 
compelling exemplar suggesting otherwise” (245). In Track Changes, technology affects writing 
but never universally. Different writers use different tools, and these different tools exist within 
the larger material and social contexts surrounding the writer and his or her writing—a host of 
conditions determines the size of a book or a sentence or the prolificness of an author. When 
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Kirschenbaum asks, “Was Nietzsche's well-documented embrace of the aphorism really a 
consequence of the Malling-Hansen Writing Ball, or of his deteriorating eyesight? Or both, or 
neither—as seems most likely—both in conjunction with myriad other factors?” it parodies any 
approach that pretends otherwise (243). 
Kirchenbaum eschews any deterministic link between technology and meaning, but he 
does suggest that the history of word processing illuminates the complex nature of writing by 
demonstrating how it remains entangled with its material and social conditions. Drawing from 
Daniel Chandler and Christina Haas, he suggests that writing necessitates many interactions with 
and within the material world: “[It] is a medial process, characterized by the author’s relationship 
to an ever-expanding array of tools and surfaces. ‘Technologies cannot be experienced in 
isolation from each other, or from their social functions,’ is how Chandler puts it. ‘Our use even 
of a pen necessitates the complementary use of related technologies (such as ink and paper) no 
less than does our use of a word processor’” (29). Two points here are of particular importance. 
First, “the ever-expanding array of tools and surfaces” emphasizes how writing not only (and 
obviously) relies on “tools and surfaces,” but also how the “array of tools and surfaces” 
continuously increases. Therefore, writing entails navigating, surveying, and selecting: someone 
might use a MacBook and Google documents (as I do) or scissors, scotch tape, a copier, and 
many other tools (as Howe does in That This and Debths) to write. Second, writing remains a 
“medial process” regardless of media. As Kirschenbaum quotes Chandler, a pen “necessitates the 
complementary use of related technologies” as much as a computer. Or, put another way, the 
difference between my use of a MacBook and Google documents and Howe’s use of scissors, 
scotch tape, a copier, and many other tools remains a difference degree, not of kind. Though one 
approach inclines towards digital media and the other towards print media, they both rely on the 
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use of material writing technologies. There are no immaterial writing technologies for 
Kirschenbaum, Chandler, and Haas; the virtual space of the computer screen is material in its 
reliance on glass, light, silicon, and even the electrical grid. 
This argument allows Kirschenbaum to orient his approach in Track Changes towards 
smaller, subtler examples that articulate the complex, mediated, and material aspects of word 
processing in particular and writing in general. “A literary history of word processing must 
therefore acknowledge not only the hybrid, heterogeneous nature of both individual persons and 
their personalities, but also the highly complex scene of writing (and rewriting) that we observe 
today, one where text morphs and twists through multiple media at nearly every stage of the 
composition and publication process,” he writes (30). Like “individual persons and 
personalities,” the “complex scene of writing” seems “hybrid” and “heterogeneous” here. The 
text that it produces, in fact, seems slightly unstable—in this passage’s alliterative phrasing, it 
“morphs and twists through multiple media.” To underscore this morphing and twisting, 
Kirschenbaum provides Neal Stephenson as an example. Stephenson describes how he composed 
his 3,000-page Baroque Cycle by drafting longhand manuscripts with “boutique fountain pens,” 
transforming those manuscripts into digital files with the text editor Emacs, typesetting those 
digital files with TeX, and, when his publisher wanted Quark files, writing a program in LISP to 
convert TeX files to Quark files. While this example seems both particularly conscious of 
writing technologies and far from the standard workflows of commercial publishers, it does serve 
a point. It not only emphasizes the morphing and twisting text of Kirschenbaum’s “complex 
scene of writing” but also expands our notion of what writing encompasses (30–31). It includes 
both a hand inscribing marks on paper with a pen and a deep knowledge of various software 
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programs and programming languages. Writing is not a simple, transparent act but a complex, 
meandering process full of different “tools and surfaces.” 
The many small-scale examples of word processing practices—from Stephen King to 
John Updike, from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick to Kamau Brathwaite—that populate Track Changes 
highlight the multitudinous effects that writing technologies have on writing. At the same time, 
however, these examples always return to the material and social realities of those effects. 
Kirschenbaum ultimately turns this argument onto the practice of literary criticism and literary 
history. He stresses, for instance, that “our writing technologies do shape our thinking” (243). 
Much like McGann, who suggests that any interpretation of a text that erases its material 
production misses much, Kirschenbaum implies that literary criticism needs to account for the 
materialities of writing technologies. Track Changes does just that: “The backbone of my 
argument has been a consideration of authorial labor in the production of writing, in conjunction 
with the material particulars of various technologies of writing” (243). Literary criticism and 
literary history can, in other words, examine “authorial labor” and “material particulars;” neither 
needs to separate the text from these two areas of inquiry. Doing so, in fact, seems increasingly 
impossible. Kirschenbaum argues, for instance, that archivists and scholars 
will have to contend not just with the legacy of writing practices that can materially 
coexist in the tiny universe of an author’s study or on top of a writer’s desk (and 
desktop). Hard drives and floppy disks will no more erase literature or literary history 
than word processing itself will, but literary history and literary criticism also will change 
as new forms of bibliographic analysis and bibliographic information—perhaps too much 
information—become available. (245)  
13 
The already complex “scene of writing” seems poised to become more complex here. Shifting 
technologies will expand it, adding “hard drives,” “floppy disks,” and outmoded operating 
systems to the already present “legacy of writing practices.” Such an expansion, though, will 
always remain material; the challenge becomes how literary history and literary criticism will 
navigate the expansion. As Kirschenbaum demonstrates, writing is always more complicated 
than we imagine, always influenced by its material and social conditions. To offer a fuller 
understanding of the texts we read, literary history and literary criticism could demonstrate how 
those texts have emerged from complex, medial, social, and ultimately material processes. 
 Like Kirschenbaum, Drucker extends some of textual scholarship’s longstanding 
premises to argue against naive approaches to writing and the text. And, again like 
Kirschenbaum, she eschews any deterministic reading of the relationship between the meaning 
of a text and the material circumstances of its production. (She parodies such “reductive 
literalism” with her example of “Neuland plus Ezra Pound plus wide spacing equals fascism” 
[60].) Yet Drucker approaches this subject from another angle where writing is never ethereal. 
Indeed, she defines it in concrete terms as “any inscription, mark, sign, line, trace, or gesture 
capable of being held and differentiated in a material substrate so that it can perform a function, 
make a record, express or communicate ideas or information, feelings, thoughts, formulae, 
protocols, instructions and so on” (19). She grounds writing in its materiality here. Never 
imperceptible, it involves perceptible inscriptions, marks, signs, lines, traces, and gestures. Those 
characteristics, moreover, remain “held and differentiated in a material substrate,” suggesting not 
only that writing involves material actions but also that writing cannot exist outside of matter 
itself. Drucker, in this respect, disabuses us of any notions that writing is immaterial. Indeed, as 
she proclaims, “the idea of writing may generate a thick cloud of theoretical smoke, but writing 
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has a rich life in the material world” (20). Though we might consider writing through “thick” 
theoretical lenses, we should remember its concrete details—pens, pencils, paper, printing 
presses as much as keyboards, monitors, hard drives, and electronic bits of information. For 
Drucker, writing is never ethereal in part because all media remains material. “Electronic 
instruments are no less material in their operation and embodiment than print objects,” she notes 
(110). More interested in media materialities than the literary-historical significance of writing 
technologies, Drucker nevertheless emphasizes the material nature of writing itself.  
 Drucker also emphasizes the material nature of the text. In doing so, she again extends 
some of the basic premises of textual scholarship to highlight the connections between the text’s 
meaning and the contexts of its production. And again, she does so from a different angle than 
Kirschenbaum. For Drucker, the text constitutes a dynamic space, not a static one, where 
meaning arises from the interactions among its constituent elements. Such elements, though 
present, often recede from our view: “Typefaces, page size, headers, footers, and column width 
are among the obvious and apparently self-evident graphic features of textual work. Whether in 
print, paint, manuscript, or electronic and material formats, such features go largely unnoticed 
unless they interfere with reading or otherwise call attention to themselves” (59). So much 
comprises any text, yet we seldom acknowledge this. Design choices might rarely announce 
themselves, Drucker implies, but they are present across media. Thus, while “frequently 
unnoticed,” they nevertheless constitute an “important part of semantic meaning production” 
(63). Not only do these elements remain present within a text, they also contribute to a text’s 
meaning—meaning emerges, at least in part, from them. Drucker draws on the example of 
William Morris’s Kelmscott Chaucer, a nineteenth-century artist’s book, to articulate this 
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argument.3 This meticulously designed edition highlights how all the material elements that 
comprise any text contribute, in some way, to its meaning: “Every area of the pictorial scene 
carries a specific material reference value as the result of the way it is defined and demarcated 
within the page” (64). Nothing on “the page” seems static, inert, or neutral here. Instead, all 
elements (“every area” in Drucker’s language) interact with each other and demonstrate their 
“specific material reference” values. Such a realization prompts Drucker to reimagine the page—
and, by extension, the text—itself. “Think of the page as a force field, a set of tensions in 
relation, which assumes a form when intervened through the productive act of reading,” she 
writes (66). Never static, the text demonstrates its dynamism through the interplay of its parts 
and its dialogue with the reader. In Drucker’s view, if writing remains complex and material 
regardless of media, then the text (again regardless of media) presents itself as matter teeming 
with meaning produced through interaction. 
If Howe’s later poetry exhibits a double movement between foregrounding the 
materiality of writing and of the text and reflecting on the nature of matter itself, textual 
scholarship and certain varieties of the digital humanities clarify much about the first part of such 
a movement. As Greetham explains, textual scholarship has long regarded process (the 
production, transmission, and reception of the text) to be as important as product (the text). We 
cannot, in fact, fully understand the latter without the former, as McGann articulates in his 
concise example of Emily Dickinson’s “Alone and in a Circumstance.” Kirschenbaum and 
Drucker, then, build on these basic premises and remind us that writing and the text remain more 
complex and more material than we might imagine. For Kirschenbaum, the development of word 
processing technologies in the late twentieth century highlights the heterogeneous nature of 
                                                      
3 The British Library has made a small number of images from this edition available at https://www.bl.uk/collection-
items/the-kelmscott-chaucer. 
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writing. Track Changes, moreover, demonstrates how the text remains entangled with the social 
and material conditions of its production, and it proposes a literary history and literary criticism 
sensitive to that entanglement. Drucker, meanwhile, suggests both that writing is never ethereal 
and that the text is never static. Instead, writing remains concrete (full of marks “held in material 
substrate”), while the text constitutes a dynamic space where meaning emerges from its 
constituent components. When viewed together, though, all of these related yet variegated 
approaches to writing and the text provide a critical framework for understanding why Howe 
emphasizes her production processes in interviews and alludes to them on the page. When we 
read, the materiality of the book (or journal, magazine, screen, et cetera) often seems to 
evanesce. Howe’s work resists this, and it calls attention to its own materiality as it so often 
attends to the nature of matter itself. 
III. The Matter of New Materialism 
 By foregrounding the materiality of her writing and her texts, Howe attunes us to her own 
meditations on the nature of matter within those texts. These meditations do not portray matter as 
something inert, nor do they envision circumstances where active human subjects simply 
perceive passive nonhuman things. Instead, they collapse the divide between human and 
nonhuman and portray matter as vibrant. While this argument seems abstract, two examples (of 
many) can help unpack it. In That This, Howe reflects on the death of her husband, the 
philosopher Peter Hare. She recalls the morning of his death, at their home in Guilford, 
Connecticut, and the “oblong blue plastic throwaway sheath—protecting the early edition of The 
New York Times” in their driveway (32). This sheath is not some simple clump of matter 
awaiting Howe’s perception. Though a nonhuman thing, it nevertheless relates to humans and 
seems more ontologically similar to them than it might at first glance. It conducts Howe’s 
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recollection of Hare and channels Hare’s importance to Howe and, in doing so, demonstrates 
some power itself. Meanwhile, in Debths, Howe declares, “A bell of the Chou dynasty is in my 
hands” (35). Though seemingly straightforward, this line again does not portray matter simply. 
Similar to the example from That This, a nonhuman thing relates to a human and seems closer to 
it than we might have previously imagined. By engendering a response from Howe—it and her 
relation to it become part of her poetry—the bell demonstrates a power that connects and is 
shared by human and nonhuman entities alike. Both of these examples are cursory, and I explore 
Howe’s meditations on matter in greater depth later in this thesis, yet they hint at how That This 
and Debths often represent nonhuman things as relational, affective, and ultimately vibrant. 
My use of the adjective “vibrant” here is deliberate. It echoes some of the arguments 
made by new materialist philosophy in general and by Jane Bennett in particular. I do not want to 
conflate Howe’s poetry with such arguments, however. Instead, I want to examine how such 
arguments can provide a vocabulary for discussing, and a framework for understanding, her 
meditations on matter in That This and Debths. Where other critical perspectives might 
emphasize affect, perception, or context, a new materialist perspective homes in on things 
themselves without discounting these emphases. It considers the sheath, the bell, the writer, and 
myriad other entities on their own terms. Such a perspective arises, however, out of a larger 
contemporary nonhuman turn in the humanities. Put simply, this turn argues against the premise 
that the human remains the measure of all things, and it encompasses various and often 
contending methodologies and theories from speculative realism to object-oriented ontology. 
Within these contexts, new materialism remains an umbrella term for various critical 
methodologies that have rethought materialism over the past twenty years. Materialism in 
academia has long referred to either historical materialism (e.g. Marx) or body materialism (e.g. 
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Butler), but contemporary scholars like Karen Barad, Manuel DeLanda, and others have 
explored, challenged, and refashioned previous materialist, monist, and pragmatist traditions to 
offer alternatives. In doing so, they have also refashioned the difference between human and 
nonhuman. New materialists have argued that capacities we often view as uniquely human—e.g. 
feeling, suffering, remembering—might be capacities shared by all matter. Bennett’s work 
emerges from these contexts, and it proposes a “thing-power” materialism that sees human and 
nonhuman things not in separate ontological spheres, but in composition. Such compositions 
represent, in Bennett’s terms, assemblages where all things demonstrate and develop their power. 
If That This and Debths regard things as more than inert matter, then Bennett’s new materialism 
allows us to delve deeper into the details of these texts. 
The nonhuman turn remains disparate and diverse, but a working group convened for the 
Modern Language Association’s 2018 convention has summarized it as scholarly inquiry both 
“obsessed with the nonhuman” and committed to reconfiguring the “standard divide between 
subject and object, agency and volition, person and thing” (PMLA 871). This same group, 
moreover, has identified numerous methodologies that comprise it. Because new materialism 
represents just one of these, it seems worthwhile to contextualize it a little further through short 
examinations of two others: speculative realism and object-oriented ontology. While both 
methodologies share with new materialism the impulse to decenter the human, they do so from 
different and sometimes contradictory angles. Steven Shaviro, for example, has argued that 
speculative realism arises from the increasingly unavoidable belief that we can no longer 
consider ourselves, as humans, unique (1). His speculative realism acknowledges both that 
nonhuman things exist independently of human perception (“realism”) and that, though 
ultimately beyond our understanding, we must imagine what such existence entails 
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(“speculative”). In The Universe of Things, Shaviro draws heavily on Alfred North Whitehead to 
suggest that speculative realism can correct the “bifurcation of nature”—the split between the 
world’s material reality and its phenomenal appearance—that has defined so many Western 
intellectual traditions. Indeed, speculative realism places all things on the same ontological plane 
where they exhibit the same capacity of “having-experience” (64). Regardless of whether we 
regard a thing as human or nonhuman, physical or phenomenal, it has experience and relates to 
other things in causal, perceptual, and many other mysterious ways (156).4 Where others had 
once divided nature, Shaviro unites it by reconceiving things and their existences. In this respect, 
speculative realism entails envisioning the hidden lives of things in order to affirm that we, as 
humans, do not occupy a privileged ontological place. 
 Meanwhile, object-oriented ontology (OOO) argues against philosophical hierarchies that 
privilege either the human or human consciousness. It instead argues for a flat ontological plane 
inhabited by objects alone. Or, as Timothy Morton exclaims in Realist Magic: Objects, 
Ontology, Causality, “there are only objects” (19). For the object-oriented ontologist, there exists 
no environment, nature, or matter—a critical difference between OOO and both speculative 
realism and new materialism—because such concepts become superfluous in a universe where 
everything emerges from objects. Thus, no top, bottom, or middle object exists, nor does the 
human subject exist despite human pretensions that would argue otherwise (Realist Magic 42–
48, 62). Morton, as well as Graham Harman before him, always examines the entity itself and 
regards any system (e.g. nature), ground (e.g. matter), or privileged position (e.g. subject) with 
suspicion. OOO wants an unmediated examination of the object because it articulates a 
                                                      
4 Shaviro uses Whitehead’s term “prehension” to describe this process (29).  
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compelling realist worldview.5 Indeed, Morton remains fascinated with the object because he 
identifies an animating “rift” between its essence and appearance (Realist Magic 26). On one 
hand, the object always withdraws; that is, it limits what other entities can apprehend about it 
thereby rendering its essence unknowable. On the other hand, it also always relates to those 
entities, presenting its appearance in those relations. This tension, in Morton’s view, “vitalizes” 
the object and explains a worldview that reduces phenomena like causality and aesthetics to it. I 
mention speculative realism and object-oriented ontology not necessarily to provide 
counterpoints to new materialism, but to illustrate that inquiry into the nonhuman has become an 
important movement within the academy. Contemporary scholarship, in some respect, provides a 
surfeit of methodologies to examine nonhuman things. 
While not monolithic, new materialism does cohere around some core principles. More 
specifically, the similarities between human and nonhuman matter and the power of things define 
much of the work associated with it. For Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, editors of New 
Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies, it represents a critical methodology that illuminates 
how all things remain more ontologically alike than we might imagine. These authors, in fact, 
quote Barad to “affirm that ‘matter feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns, and remembers’ 
because ‘feeling, conversing, suffering, desiring, yearning, and remembering are not singular 
capacities or characteristics of human consciousness’” (“What May”). Although this “notion of 
matter” seems anthropomorphic, it also collapses longstanding distinctions that we have drawn 
between human and nonhuman things. New materialism, in fact, pushes back against the many 
Western philosophical traditions that have elevated the human to the measure of all things. And 
                                                      
5 For object-oriented ontology in general and Morton in particular, neither naive realism nor eliminative materialism 
represent compelling realist worldviews. By claiming that humans have a transparent relationship with the world, 
the former seems untenable. Meanwhile, by suggesting that phenomena remain reducible to the material workings of 
the mind, the latter seems too scientistic. 
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it argues against any subset of those traditions that have elevated “consciousness” as the 
transcendent aspect of being human. For Dolphijn and van der Tuin, those “capacities or 
characteristics” we might regard as “singular” or uniquely human present themselves in all 
matter. All things might feel, converse, suffer, desire, yearn, and remember because the 
difference between things remains one of degree not of kind. Nonhuman things demonstrate a 
power we might have otherwise disregarded, and new materialism thus emphasizes “action” as 
something shared across matter (“What May”). Such action never happens “in-between” things 
but “between” them; it is not, in other words, some elusive, evanescent, and immaterial force. 
Action arises from things; whether human or nonhuman, they remain vibrant. 
These core principles ultimately become points of departure for new materialism. As 
Dolphijn and van der Tuin clarify, new materialism represents not only a set of ontological 
claims but also a critical practice. Certainly, new materialists “traverse” previous materialist, 
monist, and pragmatist traditions, weaving these disparate threads into something new, but they 
do so for concrete reasons. Indeed, when Dolphijn and van der Tuin regard new materialism as 
“an affirmation of the thinking process,” they emphasize action and envision it as a practice 
(“New Tradition”). More pointedly, they position it as “a practical philosophy” that those in the 
academy might use to address pertinent topics across disciplines. The two authors, for example, 
argue that new materialism “makes way for thinking metamorphoses regarding ... axes of social 
difference” like class, race, gender, and sexuality (“New Tradition”). It allows us, in other words, 
to rethink and transform how we discuss these common categories of “social difference.” At the 
same time, Dolphijn and van der Tuin suggest that this critical methodology might also 
transform scholarly considerations of artworks: 
22 
A new materialist perspective would be interested in finding out how the form of content 
(the material condition of the artwork) and the form of expression (the sensations as they 
come about) are being produced in one another … In this way, new materialism is 
different from most post-Kantian studies of art, since in these studies, the material and 
discursive dimensions are treated separately. After a short description of the materials 
used following a “crude materialism,” the contemporary scholar influenced by the so-
called “linguistic turn” proceeds to deconstruct its messages. New materialism allows for 
the study of the two dimensions in their entanglement: the experience of a piece of art is 
made up of matter and meaning. (“New Tradition”) 
In this “new materialist perspective,” the forms of content and expression always remain 
entangled. We cannot separate the materiality of art from the sensations that arise from it, nor 
should we. Rather than divide the “material and discursive dimensions,” we should examine the 
two in conjunction. New materialism allows for this by asserting that “matter and meaning” 
comprise any artwork—or any book of poetry for the purposes of this thesis. Thus, it not only 
traverses previous materialist, monist, and pragmatist traditions to rethink materialism but also 
encourages new critical practices across disciplines.  
 Bennett operates within macro (the nonhuman turn) and micro (the new materialism) 
contexts, and her work offers the clearest vocabulary for discussing and framework for 
considering Howe’s meditations on matter. It does so primarily by espousing a “thing-power” 
materialism. In a 2004 article, “The Force of Things,” Bennett introduces this materialism as 
something that privileges neither economic conditions nor the human body, defining her project 
as an alternative to more established materialism derived from Marxism and queer theory. She 
instead proposes, in her words, a “speculative onto-story” that imagines what might arise from a 
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greater attention to nonhuman things (348, 349). To promote such attention, Bennett discusses 
four closely-related concepts. First, and most pertinent to this thesis, she introduces the 
assemblage as the arrangement of human and nonhuman materials and the means by which the 
former registers the vividness of the latter. Citing a scene from personal experience, where 
asphalt, a glove, a dead rat, a bottle, a cap, a stick, and a human comprise an affecting 
assemblage, Bennett argues that “objects appear more vividly as things ... as entities not entirely 
reducible to the contexts in which (human) subjects set them” (351). Things, then, are never 
synonymous with our access to or knowledge of them. In fact, we remain in composition with 
them. Second, she defines self-organization as the power of nonhuman things to coalesce and 
persist through some shared force. Such a force courses through all matter, human and 
nonhuman, granting it vibrancy and vitality. Third, Bennett builds off her discussions of the 
assemblage by introducing the concept of conjunction whereby a thing’s power arises through its 
relations with other things. If the vividness of things becomes clear in assemblages, then this 
vividness emerges when one thing operates in conjunction with others (354). Fourth, she refers 
to “actancy” as the ability of a human or nonhuman thing to cohere, persist, and ultimately do 
something (355). For Bennett, human and nonhuman things become vivid in assemblages, 
demonstrate their power through some shared self-organizing force, build this power through 
their relations with other things, and then ultimately act. 
 If “The Force of Things” introduces Bennett’s “thing-power” materialism, then her book 
Vibrant Matter (2010) extends and elaborates upon it. Her discussion of the assemblage becomes 
much clearer here, especially as it relates to the power that things demonstrate: 
Bodies enhance their power in or as a heterogeneous assemblage. What this suggests for 
the concept of agency is that the efficacy or effectivity to which that term has 
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traditionally referred becomes distributed across an ontologically heterogeneous field, 
rather than being a capacity localized within a human body or in a collective produced 
(only) by human efforts. The sentences of this book also emerged from the confederate 
agency of many striving macro- and microactants: from “my” memories, intentions, 
contentions, intestinal bacteria, eyeglasses, and blood sugar, as well as from the plastic 
computer keyboard, the bird song from the open window, or the air or particulates in the 
room, to name only a few participants. (23) 
Things, in other words, may have some inherent power, but that power becomes apparent 
through an assemblage. Bennett’s “bodies” here “enhance” their power through either their 
relations with or by being comprised of other “heterogeneous” things. This, in turn, has 
implications for how we conceive agency. Whereas we might present agency as uniquely human, 
Bennett argues that agency remains “distributed” across many human and nonhuman things. We 
can, in her words, find agency across an “ontologically heterogeneous field”—that is, across an 
assemblage of “macro- and microactants.” She even turns this argument onto Vibrant Matter 
itself. Her sentences emerge from “the confederate agency” of many materials. Bennett, in fact, 
sees her text as the result not just of her thoughts but also of her body, her computer, and the 
sounds and substances swirling around her. (The allusion to the computer seems particularly 
evocative: a textual scholar like Greetham or McGann or a digital humanist like Kirschenbaum 
or Drucker would argue that, of course, any text emerges from the material contexts of its 
production.) Her articulation of the assemblage, therefore, represents the arrangement of human 
and nonhuman things and the means by which they demonstrate and enhance their vibrancy. 
 As Bennett delves deeper into the assemblage, this connection between it and the power 
of all things becomes stronger. She writes, for examples, that “assemblages are ad hoc groupings 
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of diverse elements, of vibrant materials of all sorts” (23). By emphasizing the “diverse 
elements” that comprise any assemblage, Bennett again underscores its heterogeneous nature. 
And, by likening those elements to “vibrant materials of all sorts,” she demonstrates how any 
assemblage contains and intensifies the power of things. Thus, human and nonhuman things both 
enter these “ad hoc groupings” and exist within them as “vibrant materials.” Assemblages might 
even exhibit too much vibrancy. As Bennett claims, these “living, throbbing confederations ... 
are able to function despite the persistent presence of energies that confound them from within” 
(23–24). The language here is striking. Assemblages “live” and “throb,” they teem with 
“persistent presence of energies,” and they seem contradictory, confusing, and “confounding.” 
Again, by presenting the assemblage in such fashion, Bennett intensifies its relationship with the 
power of things. Matter is vibrant, but we really understand that only through these 
“confederations” of matter. In the end, the assemblage leads Bennett back to human-nonhuman 
divide that her “thing-power” materialism refashions. It promotes, in her words, “a theory of 
action that crosses the human-nonhuman divide” (24). A confederation of human and nonhuman 
things, it demonstrates the power of those things as they enhance their power.  
While such a “theory of action” might seem far-fetched, Bennett suggests that we 
reconsider such skepticism in the light of how little we know about human action. Indeed, she 
asks, “In the face of every analysis, human agency remains something of a mystery. If we do not 
know how it is that human agency operates, can we be so sure that the processes through which 
nonhumans make their mark is qualitatively different?” (34). If human agency remains 
mysterious, then why should we regard it as different in kind than nonhuman agency? Or, 
extrapolating further, if the human remains mysterious, then why should we assign it some 
ontologically superior status when compared with the nonhuman? Bennett questions such 
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impulses through her presentation of the assemblage in Vibrant Matter. Her new materialist 
perspective envisions all matter relating to, interacting with, and affecting other matter on a 
flatter ontological plane. We just need to look: “On close-enough inspection, the productive 
power that has engendered an effect will turn out to be a confederacy, and the human actants 
within it will themselves turn out to be confederations of tools, microbes, minerals, sounds, and 
other ‘foreign’ materialities” (36). If a “productive power” produces an “effect,” that power 
represents neither some immaterial force or something uniquely human. Instead, it represents a 
“confederacy” that contains human and nonhuman things alike. Within such confederacies, 
“human actants” are never singular entities but “confederations” of various “materialities” that 
we never conceive as human. Thus, the human becomes suffused with the nonhuman, and the 
stable distinction we might have drawn between the two becomes much blurrier. For Bennett, the 
assemblage foregrounds all of this. 
Howe’s later work exhibits a double movement between foregrounding the materiality of 
the text and meditating on matter. Yet considering each part of that movement requires a 
vocabulary and a framework. If the thread of contemporary digital humanities influenced by 
textual scholarship allows us to grasp the first part, then Bennett’s new materialism, emerging 
from the contemporary fascination with nonhuman things, allows us to grasp the second part. 
Indeed, it both attunes us to the nonhuman things within Howe’s poetry and explains why 
references to an “oblong blue plastic throwaway sheath—protecting the early edition of The New 
York Times” and a “bell of the Chou dynasty” are not throwaway details. Such things remain 
more ontologically similar to us than we might imagine. In fact, they remain in composition with 
us through assemblages where they demonstrate and develop their “thing-power.” And such 
“thing-power” is never localized, homogeneous, or synonymous with humans but distributed, 
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heterogeneous, and shared across all matter. Viewed together, then, these vocabularies and 
frameworks—from the omnipresent relationship between a text’s meaning and the circumstances 
of its production to the affecting power of an assemblage—promote a reading of Howe where the 
text’s materiality and the text’s representations of matter always play off of each other. 
IV. The Double Movements of That This and Debths 
 Michael Davidson claims that while every writer possesses “a materializing tendency,” 
we seldom see that tendency displayed in the text (93). It disappears as the writer, scholar, or 
publisher transforms messy manuscripts into (seemingly) finished products. What, then, can we 
make of Howe’s efforts to foreground her own materializing tendency in That This and Debths? 
Her word collages, page layout, and frequent gestures to the physical circumstances of writing 
and the text do not represent ends in and of themselves. They have larger implications. Other 
critics—like Davidson, Marjorie Perloff, and Elisa New to name three examples—argue that 
Howe’s attention to the physical features of her texts always accomplishes something concrete, 
such as recovering marginal or marginalized voices, reconceiving the lyric subject within a more 
experimental poetics, or highlighting the infrastructures that support the production of literature. 
I, too, agree with this general argument. At the same time, however, I want to examine the 
specific ways in which That This and Debths call attention to their materialities in order to make 
an ontological claim. Doing so requires examining, first, how each book demonstrates Howe’s 
materializing tendency and, second, how that tendency accentuates, amplifies, or articulates a 
claim about matter itself. That This includes many striking physical features from Howe’s well-
known “collaged fragments” and blocks of verse to deliberately blank pages and photograms. As 
these lead us to reflect on the materiality of the text, Howe simultaneously reflects on the 
materials she has long associated with her recently deceased husband. Indeed, assemblages of 
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human and nonhuman conduct and channel these reflections. Debths, meanwhile, includes many 
of the same physical features as That This, and it too remains interested in assemblages of human 
and nonhuman things. Yet here these features lead us into meditations on how such assemblages 
mediate our temporal experiences. The poet, in fact, registers past, present, and future through 
her interactions with many material entities. While the impulses—to materialize, to examine 
matter—remain similar in Howe’s later work, they play out in distinctive manners in each book. 
Davidson’s remark above, from his 1997 book Ghostlier Demarcations: Modern Poetry 
in the Material World, naturally appears after he discusses Howe at length. Where other critics 
approach Howe through Language poetry and its rejection of the lyric subject (a clear and 
personal poetic voice), Davidson argues that we might be better suited attending the materialities 
of her texts (92). And he extends that argument to critique post-structuralist approaches to 
literature that elevate “signifying systems” above the forms—“the layering of physical 
documents and their institutional origins”—that support those systems (93). We might, in other 
words, adopt an approach that examines language and its materiality simultaneously. Thus when 
he suggests that Howe questions the self-knowledge of the female poet confronted by the male 
gaze, for example, he also claims that such questions occur “through textual practices that 
foreground the difficulty of reading. Since many of her lines physically overlap, leaving little 
room to read them, she calls attention to the physicality of the print medium and its presumed 
transparency to something more ‘real’ beyond the page” (79). Again, Howe complicates any 
division we might draw between her thematic concerns and her “textual practices.” Questions of 
gender remain, for Davidson, entangled with “the difficulty of reading” her work (My Emily 
Dickinson [1985] in this example) where “lines physically overlap” and obscure words, phrases, 
and paragraphs. Or when he suggests that The Nonconformist’s Memorial dramatizes a major 
29 
literature’s erasure of a minor literature, he also suggests it does so by “violating normal 
typographic spacing,” “jumbling” words, and calling attention to the print medium (86). 
Davidson’s work, in this respect, demonstrates that critical studies of Howe must always contend 
both with her materializing tendency and with what that tendency accomplishes. 
 Marjorie Perloff also distinguishes Howe from Language poetry while acknowledging, 
somewhat implicitly, Howe’s material practices. For Perloff, if Language poetry complicates the 
lyric subject, and if Howe frequently employs autobiography in her poetry, perhaps we need to 
reexamine our approaches to both. As she argues, Howe herself appears “in the interstices of the 
text: ‘Now draw a trajectory in imagination where logic and mathematics meet the materials of 
art. Canvas, paper, pencil, color, frame, title’ (FS, p. 27). Right after this catalogue of artist's 
tools (where ‘title’ is the odd item) the cited overprint text becomes illegible, forcing the reader 
to become a kind of viewer/voyeur” (429). While this argument uncovers the lyric subject in 
Howe’s Frame Structures (1996), it also highlights how difficult it remains for critics to separate 
thematic concerns from the materiality of her work. To make her point, Perloff quotes a passage 
whose words (“canvas, paper, pencil”) and design (“cited overprint text becomes illegible”) call 
attention to the medium. Although less interested than Davidson in the materiality of Howe’s 
work, Perloff cannot avoid it. Another passage, near the end of her essay “Language Poetry and 
the Lyrical Subject,” highlights this: 
Add to such voices the visual devices—line placement, typography, page design—that 
characterize all four of the early books reprinted in Frame Structures, as well as the new 
preface, and you have a signature (quite literally a series of marks made on paper) as 
unique and “personal” as any we have in poetry today. What then of the purported death 
of the subject? (431) 
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As Perloff elaborates upon her argument—that Frame Structures does indeed feature a lyric 
subject—she returns to its material particulars. The “visual devices” of “line placement, 
typography, [and] page design” contribute to Howe’s personal “signature.” Even the choice of 
“signature,” and the parenthetical statement that follows, here suggests a critic attuned to the 
seemingly omnipresent interplay between the thematic concerns and materialities in her poetry. 
 Recent scholarship on Howe often takes this interplay as its point of departure. Elisa 
New, for example, suggests that the material features of Souls of the Labadie Tract (2007) 
demonstrates how the poetry itself remains connected to material infrastructures. As New writes, 
Howe’s stylistic crossweave demonstrates [that] universities, intellectual communities, 
the professoriat, are not merely the settings in which minds operate, providing rooms for 
them to train limpid vision on objets d’art. Universities with their libraries and offices, 
their copiers and faxes, their sprawling neighborhoods of rental housing and substantial 
real estate, and not least their demographic instability and their transatlantic traffic, are 
part of the texture, entering the pure realm of ideas. (280) 
Not only does Howe call attention to her medium through a “stylistic crossweave,” but such 
attention highlights the infrastructures from which that crossweave emerges. Her poetry does not 
erase the textures of intellectual communities—replete with libraries, offices, housing and their 
associated supplies—but foregrounds them. New demonstrates, once again, that critics of Howe 
cannot divide thematic concerns from material particulars, nor should they. I do not want to 
suggest, however, that all critical approaches to Howe remain the same. Indeed, Davidson, 
Perloff, and New all examine different books, display different interests, and ultimately present 
different arguments. Instead, I want to use this short survey of Howe scholarship to emphasize 
three particular points. First, nearly any critical approach to her work contends, either explicitly 
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or implicitly, with her material practices. Second, those material practices never represent ends in 
and of themselves but convey other themes within her work. Third, if we always contend with 
these material practices that accentuate, amplify, or articulate something in addition to 
themselves, we might want to understand what they convey about matter itself. 
 In “The Disappearance Approach,” the opening prose section of That This, Howe attunes 
us to the materiality of the text by detailing her archival research. A self-described “library 
cormorant,” she spends much of this section detailing her forays into the papers of Jonathan 
Edwards at the Beinecke (“Susan Howe’s Telepathy”). Naturally, she finds that archive 
materially rich: 
The folio-size double leaves Jonathan, Sarah, and his ten tall sisters wrote were often 
homemade: hand-stitched from linen rags salvaged by women from worn out clothing. 
Grassroots out-of-tune steps and branches, quotations of psalms, dissonant scripture 
clusters, are pressed between coarse cardboard covers with frayed edges. The rag paper 
color has grown deeper and richer in some. One in particular, with a jacket he constructed 
from old newspapers then tied together at the center with string, looks like a paper model 
for a canoe. (22) 
The Edwards papers here do not constitute some transparent medium into his, his wife’s, or his 
sisters’ thoughts. Composed of heterogeneous materials and content, from “linen rags” to 
“cardboard covers” and from “out-of-tune steps” to “dissonant scripture clusters,” they instead 
emerge from many different things. All of these different things never coalesce into one stable 
set of “folio-size double leaves,” but remain mutable, and they announce their materialities in 
their mutations. Some exhibit “rag paper” that “has grown deeper and richer” since the 
eighteenth century; another, constructed from “old newspaper” and “string,” seems to transform 
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into a paper “canoe” in front of the poet’s eyes. Though Howe favors seemingly straightforward 
prose and typographic conventions in “The Disappearance Approach,” she also asks her readers 
to envision texts that display, in Edward Allen’s phrase, a “knot of materials” (407). 
 This “knot,” Howe suggests, ultimately extends beyond the Edwards papers to the 
archive itself. Indeed, “The Disappearance Approach” simultaneously foregrounds the 
materiality of these eighteenth-century manuscripts and the infrastructures that contain them. She 
reproduces, for example, the following bibliographic information from a Beinecke finding aid (a 
document used by researchers to find archival materials): “GEN MSS 151, Box 24, Folder 1379. 
Hannah Edwards, Diary Fragment/ ca. 1739” (29). If Howe asks her readers to imagine the 
materially rich nature of the Edwards papers, she also reminds us to remember the materially rich 
nature of the boxes, folders, and libraries that contain them. This becomes clearer later, when she 
comments that “The Beinecke Rare Book Room and Manuscript Library, one of the largest 
buildings in the world devoted entirely to rare books and manuscripts, was constructed from 
Vermont marble and granite, bronze and glass during the early 1960s” (30). These are not 
arbitrary details. By listing the elements that comprise the Beinecke itself, Howe accentuates her 
earlier descriptions of the Edwards archive where the manuscripts emerge from diverse materials 
and change with time. The Beinecke, too, emerges from diverse materials (marble, granite, 
bronze, and glass) and a particular moment of time (the 1960s). Viewed together, these 
descriptions of the Edwards papers and the infrastructures that support them suggest that some 
creative interplay exists among these materially rich entities. As Howe reads a 1736 journal entry 
from Hannah Edwards, she remarks that “under the fan-cooled copy lights, she [Edwards] speaks 
to herself of the loneliness of being Narcissus” (31). By calling attention to the “fan-cooled copy 
lights,” Howe adds another layer to her discussions of the Edwards archive. Her experience here 
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becomes one where multiple materials—Hannah Edwards’s voice transposed onto paper, the 
Beinecke’s physical layout, and her own perceptions of both—interact and, through that 
interaction, produce an effect. This section of That This, though seemingly straightforward in its 
own visual design and material features, asks its readers to imagine those “knots” that comprise 
these eighteenth-century manuscripts and the twenty-first-century systems that support them. 
 As Howe’s “The Disappearance Approach” gestures towards the materially rich nature of 
the text by discussing her archival research, Howe also discusses her own writing processes to 
underscore this gesture. At one point, she reproduces an earlier poem of hers and claims, “I 
wrote this poem on a winter day in 1998 when my mother was still alive, and I hadn’t met Peter. 
I had been reading Xerox copies of the last journal pages from the microform edition of the 
manuscripts of Charles Sanders Peirce” (24). Such commentary, to borrow the vocabulary of 
textual scholarship, places process (the production, transmission, and reception of the text) and 
product (the text) on the same critical plane. Howe devotes space to the poem itself and the 
circumstances of its production—the winter day in 1998, her familial relations, and the Xerox- 
and microform-mediated texts she was reading. It also highlights Kirschenbaum’s argument that 
writing remains technologically mediated and, therefore, highly complex. If Howe’s composition 
process includes reading the manuscripts of Charles Sanders Peirce, then the allusions to “Xerox 
copies” and a “microform edition” demonstrate how texts twist through numerous media and, in 
doing so, inform the production of other texts. She also considers the production of “Frolic 
Architecture,” another section of That This: “Even the ‘invisible’ scotch tape I recently used 
when composing [it] leaves traces on paper when I run each original sheet through the Canon 
copier” (31). While Howe calls attention to the materially rich nature of other texts (the Edwards 
papers, a previous poem of hers) elsewhere in That This, here she calls attention to the 
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materiality of the text her reader holds. She finds “traces” within it. Writing this text was never, 
for Howe, an ethereal process but one that relied on materials as variegated as “scotch tape” and 
a “Canon copier.” Once again, although “The Disappearance Approach” adopts a straightforward 
visual design, it nevertheless attunes its readers to the physical complexity of the text by 
considering the archive, the infrastructures that support it, and ultimately Howe’s own writing 
processes. 
 The second section of That This, “Frolic Architecture,” however, calls attention to the 
materiality of writing and of the text in a more striking manner. It opens, for example, with a 
full-page photogram—an image made with light-sensitive paper but without a camera—from the 
artist James Welling (“Photogram”). By jumping from prose to image, Howe suggests that the 
text need not confine itself to standard or straightforward presentation. In fact, the opacity of 
Welling’s photogram (one of six included in “Frolic Architecture”) suggests that the text remains 
more textured than we might imagine. The light splotches that pockmark it, as well as the dark 
streaks that run down its right side, imbue the otherwise smooth surface of the page with a 
textural depth (see figure 1 and note that all figures appear in the Appendix). Whereas the page, 
in That This, might have previously seemed like a transparent medium for language, this first 
photogram suggests a new murkiness. Howe then jumps again, from the photogram to a four-line 
block of verse set in the middle of an otherwise nearly empty page: 
 That this book is a history of 
 a shadow that is a shadow of 
 me mystically one in another 
 Another another to subserve (39) 
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Here she intensifies the textural depth that Welling’s photogram introduces. Opening this block 
with “That this book,” obviously, alludes to the book’s title and calls further attention to it as a 
material thing. At the same time, however, the verse that follows emphasizes that this material 
thing—like the Edwards papers, the Beinecke, earlier poems, or writing and the text generally—
represents “a knot” of many material things. For Howe, That This becomes “a history of a 
shadow,” and that shadow itself becomes “a shadow of / me.” Her book does not represent some 
transparent window where her language maps clearly onto her thought. Rather, many entities—
even those as seemingly immaterial as “a history” or “a shadow”—comprise That This. She adds, 
in other words, layer upon layer to her book. And by repeating “another / Another another,” she 
accelerates this layering until the layers become multitudinous—many things comprise her text. 
If the standard design of “The Disappearance Approach” belie the textural depth of That This, 
then the opening pages of “Frolic Architecture” forcefully channels that depth. 
 These pages soon segue into the word collages—fragments of text, cut, copied, remixed, 
and reproduced—that constitute the bulk of “Frolic Architecture.” While each collage, through 
its construction, calls attention to the materiality of writing and of the text, I only want to 
examine a few in detail here. On page 48, for example, Howe presents a collage that seems to 
include fragments from six different texts crashing into each other at odd angles (see figure 2). 
We can see the lines of the “‘invisible’ Scotch tape” mentioned in “The Disappearance 
Approach” running diagonally across the collage. These marks, therefore, foreground the 
material circumstances of the writing process and the text at hand. They call to mind not only the 
tape referenced earlier but also the Canon copier, the paper, and even Howe’s hands constructing 
it in concert with these tools. The collage appears, moreover, as a block set in the middle of an 
otherwise empty page thereby evoking the four-line block of verse, set in similar fashion, that 
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begins “Frolic Architecture.” If that verse seems more ambiguous when compared to the prose of 
the preceding section, then this collage seems more ambiguous when compared to that verse. 
Howe, in this respect, adds to the textural depth of That This through all of her collages. Within 
this particular example, most of the words remain partially occluded yet some emerge from the 
confusion. Consider how “leaves in lower left,” “paper,” and “cloth” all appear somewhat, if not 
fully, visible. All of these fragments have some textual import: “leaves” refer to pages, “lower 
left” suggests page layout instructions, “paper” and “cloth” allude to two frequent materials used 
when printing books. Visual design and text combine here to remind us that the text we are 
reading remains one composed by and comprised of many material things. A similar example 
appears on page 81 where Howe employs the same approach—multiple texts crashing into each 
other, visible lines from the Scotch tape, collage centered with ample surrounding white space—
to the same end (see figure 3). There, however, “covering the pages” emerges from clashing 
fragments to remind us again of the complex nature of writing and the text. 
 “Frolic Architecture” adds to the textural depth of That This in unexpected ways too. 
Throughout “The Disappearance Approach,” Howe calls attention to the materialities of writing 
and of the text by emphasizing common archival objects. At one point, in fact, she includes the 
bibliographic information from a Beinecke finding aid in her prose. Similar information appears 
in her word collages. On page 49, for example, while fragments from several distinct texts 
overlap, the semibold “Box 24 Folder 1377” appears clearly. On page 51, “1208 EF G 3 of 3 
folders” emerges from a twisting-and-turning confusion of multiple texts. On page 54, “aper 
band/n.d. Folder 1376” runs vertically down the left side of that page’s collage. And, finally, on 
page 65 numerous folder numbers—1379, 151, 1379, 1713–1773—rise from a sharp line that 
otherwise cuts off the text. With each of these fragments, Howe echoes her suggestions in “The 
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Disappearance Approach” that a “knot of materials” comprise both the text and the 
infrastructures that support it. At the same time, however, these echoes remix those earlier 
suggestions. “Frolic Architecture” does not present this bibliographic information within a prose 
essay or through standard typographic conventions; instead, it presents them again but in a slant 
fashion. They pop out from clashing fragments or zig and zag through a collage. Where the 
earlier allusion to the manuscripts, boxes, and folders of the Beinecke attune us to various 
materialities, these later allusions intensify that feeling. 
 As striking as these word collages can appear, and as detailed as the prose reflections on 
writing, the text, and the archive can sound, Howe employs them to articulate an ontological 
claim. These stylistic, materializing choices remain only the first part of the double movement in 
her work. To paraphrase Davidson on Howe, they have implications that critics need to 
investigate; indeed, they occur alongside and entangled with other thematic considerations. 
Throughout That This, Howe approaches her deceased husband Peter Hare through the diverse 
entities she has long associated with him, herself included. Her presentation of these assemblages 
of human (Howe, Hare) and nonhuman (books, desks) things ultimately suggests that all matter 
exhibits some vibrancy. For example, the opening pages of “The Disappearance Approach” 
include a scene where a confederation of things demonstrates its power by channeling and 
conducting the poet’s memories of her husband: 
Some paperwhites he loved to plant and bring to flower are thriving in our living room. 
Paperwhites are in the daffodil family so have their sweet spring scent … On the 
computer screen I find a short essay he was writing on poetry and philosophy but never 
showed me. There’s a letter to his first wife’s brother, signed, “Peter and Sukey.” I wish 
38 
we were Hansel and Gretel with pebbles as a hedge against the day before and the day 
after. (14–15) 
At first glance, this passage alludes to the materiality of writing and of the text like so many 
other passages in That This. Howe remarks on “the computer screen” and a signed letter; even 
the “paperwhites,” flowers from the daffodil family, suggest the white space of a book’s paper 
pages. At the same time, however, it articulates a greater point about matter. Indeed, the 
paperwhites, the computer, the letter, and Howe herself become an assemblage where the human 
registers the vividness of nonhuman things. The paperwhites here are not just visually alluring 
flowers, the computer is not a passive collection of plastic, glass, and silicon, and the letter is not 
a throwaway piece of paper. Instead, and in conjunction with Howe herself, they form a 
heterogeneous grouping of vibrant things that become more vibrant in that grouping. And they 
ultimately engender, in Bennett’s phrase, a “productive effect.” That effect becomes especially 
clear in this passage’s closing sentence where, with all of these entities channelling thoughts of 
the deceased Hare, Howe laments that she cannot return to some childlike state (“Hansel and 
Gretel”) and “hedge” against both past and future (“the day before and the day after”). 
 Other assemblages produce similar effects in That This, especially as Howe describes the 
details of her Guilford house. Later in “The Disappearance Approach,” for example, she turns 
her attention from a blue swatch from the wedding dress of Sarah Pierrepont, the wife of 
Jonathan Edwards, to the particularly affecting household scenes that followed Hare’s death: 
Could it be an illusory correlation that causes my brain to repetitively connect this single 
swatch with the oblong royal blue plastic throwaway sheath—protecting the early edition 
of The New York Times as it lay on our driveway on the morning of January 3rd, and 
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again with the bright cyan book jacket on the complimentary copy of Richard Rorty: The 
Making of an American Philosopher that arrived for Peter in the mail a month later? (32) 
Once again, this passage both calls attention to the materiality of writing and of the text—by 
mentioning a “single swatch” from the Edwards archive, the sheath that covers a newspaper, the 
jacket that covers a book—and articulates an ontological claim. Like the example above, the 
swatch, the sheath, and the book jacket do not represent inert pieces of matter but nonhuman 
entities that announce and enhance their vibrancies within an assemblage. Howe becomes part of 
this assemblage too, as her “brain” repetitively connects the swatch with both the sheath and the 
book jacket. This confederation ultimately engenders another productive effect where Howe 
cannot separate her research in the Edwards archive from the trauma associated with Hare’s 
death. The plaintive, questioning tone here demonstrates the manner in which one blurs into the 
other. While Howe considers that such an effect might constitute “an illusory correlation,” her 
presentation of the swatch, the sheath, the book jacket, and herself suggests otherwise. These 
things, in fact, coalesce into an assemblage that makes that correlation anything but illusory. 
 Similar assemblages appear—and produce distinctive effects—when Howe chronicles the 
details of Hare’s stately Buffalo, New York house. Consider, for example, her initial impressions 
of that place: 
Old family oil portraits, various objects from the China Trade, engravings of genteel 
nineteenth-century Episcopalian ministers, and over the dining room table a painting of 
“The US Squadron Commanded by Comd. S. Rodgers sailing from Port Mahon. 
Respectfully dedicated to M. C. Perry Esq. of the U.S.N. by his most obt. Servant S. 
Cabrolla, Gibralta, 10 May 1826” in its solid wood frame beckoned me into an 
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environment where ancestors figured as tender grass springing out of the earth. They 
were saying, “Susan, child of our history, come home, come on in.” (16–17) 
This passage articulates a history wherein Hare’s family contributes to and benefits from the 
longstanding commercial, religious, and military establishments of the United States. (It also 
exemplifies what Dan Chiasson has deemed Howe’s love of Yankee “material culture” [“Susan 
Howe’s Patchwork Poems”].) The “oil portraits,” remnants of “the China Trade,” engravings, 
and the imposing painting of a navy “Squadron” signify a lineage closely connected to American 
expansion and success. And while Howe feels enveloped by the environment created by this 
lineage, she never becomes fully part of it. Hare’s ancestors, in fact, call out to her as a “child of 
[their] history,” not as a child of her own. These things ultimately produce such an effect on 
Howe, but they do so both as signifiers of class and privilege and as affecting materials within an 
assemblage. Indeed, all of these things together “beckoned” Howe into this environment that 
remains both alluring and never fully hers. 
 Later, Howe finds another agglomeration of things that channels and conducts thoughts 
of her late husband. Considering Hare’s Buffalo house at greater length, she describes the 
following scene: 
The room I loved most was the study upstairs. He rarely used it except as storage space 
for his many books. A large dilapidated desk that his father, a modernist architect, 
designed and constructed during the 1930s, was littered with old syllabi, letters and 
journals. A worn wall-to-wall carpet hushed the place and I had the same intense 
impression of the past pressing heavily on the present I often feel when I’m alone with 
books and papers. “I’ll go to him—I’ll find him,” I thought … (18) 
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Like the earlier scenes drawn from the Guilford house, this scene simultaneously foregrounds the 
materiality of writing and of the text and meditates on the nature of matter. By turning to the 
study, Hare’s “storage space for his many books,” Howe again calls attention to the physical 
nature of the medium—writing produces texts, texts become books, books accumulate and 
impinge upon otherwise unused space. The “large dilapidated desk” also gestures towards this; it 
becomes both a materialized scene of writing and a repository of texts (“old syllabi, letters and 
journals”). Yet Howe joins the books, the desk, the papers that “litter” it, and even the “worn 
wall-to-wall carpet” in an affecting assemblage of human and nonhuman things here. Within that 
assemblage, moreover, all of these entities display and develop a power that ultimately creates an 
“intense impression of the past pressing heavily on the present.” Indeed, they evoke memories of 
research libraries for Howe, and they encourage her to delve into the materials surrounding her in 
order to “go to” and “find” the deceased Hare. The nonhuman contents of this study are anything 
but passive. 
 Throughout That This, Howe’s tendency to materialize and her reflections on matter 
interact with each other. Whether through prose, verse, or visual design, she frequently calls 
attention to the materiality of writing and of the text. Yet such calls are never ends in and of 
themselves. Rather, they accentuate Howe’s own meditations on matter where human and 
nonhuman things coalesce and demonstrate and develop some power. Published in 2017, Debths 
has some similarities with That This. It also opens with a prose essay that explores the various 
materialities of a particular archive (Howe’s own in this case). Many of the visual design 
techniques used in That This resurface in Debths too, from word collages to page layouts with 
generous margins and copious white space. Ultimately, these explorations and techniques help 
articulate the ontological claim that matter is neither passive nor inert, but vibrant. Where That 
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This approaches this claim through the deceased Hare, however, Debths approaches it through 
temporal experience. Or, more specifically, Howe’s sense of time—of past, present, and future—
seems mediated by human and nonhuman things alike in this book. As such things coalesce into 
assemblages, and as they display and develop their power, they engender a productive effect that 
structures the poet’s own temporal experience. 
Like That This, Debths features an opening prose section, “Foreword,” that adopts a 
straightforward visual design but nevertheless attunes us to the materiality of writing and of the 
text. Unlike that earlier book, however, this book does not accomplish that through examinations 
of the Edwards papers at the Beinecke. Rather, Howe delves into her own archive, and she 
examines the editions contained therein that resonate most with her. Consider, for example, the 
following passage: 
I treasure my edition of The Secret Languages of Ireland by R.A. Stewart Macalister. It’s 
reprinted by Craobh Books (Armagh, 1997) and has a paper over board cover, a plain 
light blue jacket with text normally reserved for the inside flap in simple serif typeface, 
so the effect is both dryly pedagogical and rebellious. According to Macalister the work 
is based on a random collection of loose sheets, letters, manuscript notebooks, scraps of 
paper, dictionary slips ... Secret Languages is wonderfully littered with etymological 
particulars, diacritical characters, hieroglyphs, wordlists, oblique slashes. (21) 
Here, writing never seems like something ethereal and the physicality of the text never 
disappears. Instead, the poet’s treasured edition of The Secret Languages of Ireland highlights 
the materialities of both process and product. Howe, in fact, mentions that the work emerges 
from “a random collection” of disparate materials—“loose sheets, letters, manuscript notebooks, 
scraps of paper, dictionary slips”—that Macalister assembles during the writing process. The 
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product that emerges, meanwhile, then seems to highlight the disparate materials that constitute 
it. More specifically, the poet admires the “paper over board,” “light blue jacket,” and “simple 
serif typeface” that form its external cover. She likewise admires its “wonderfully littered” 
internal pages full of uncommon visual features ranging from “etymological particulars” to 
“oblique slashes.” While Howe presents “Foreword” through lucid prose and straightforward 
design, she nevertheless delves into her archive and asks us to envision an edition that both 
emerges from and displays various materials. 
 Later, Howe expands upon this theme when she declares the type of edition that most 
appeals to her. “I enjoy facsimile editions,” she declares, “(such as the Cornell New Poems: 
Manuscript Materials) of poets whose manuscripts have a strong visual component” (22). Given 
Howe’s own poetic inclinations towards “a strong visual component,” this seems unsurprising. 
By declaring this so straightforwardly, however, she reminds us that her work contains many 
components and that we should not conflate her use of prose essay with her poetics as a whole. 
She continues, “What interests me most isn’t the photographed handwritten original on the even 
numbered side but the facing typographical transcription on the odd. These doggedly Quixotic 
efforts are a declaration of faith” (22). Again, Howe asks to envision an edition that emerges 
from and displays many materials here. She seems attracted to these facsimile editions, such as 
New Poems: Manuscript Materials that surveys the textual practices and works of W. B. Yeats, 
because of their clashing components. On one hand, the “photographed handwritten” originals of 
this edition underscore its materiality. Where “handwritten” highlights the physicality of writing, 
“photographed handwritten” then demonstrates how the text arises from and displays various 
materials like paper, ink, film, and light. On the other hand, the “typographical” transcriptions of 
these originals intrigue Howe in part because they add another layer to the edition. Producing 
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them seems both “doggedly Quixotic” and “declaration[s] of faith” because the originals remain 
both materially rich and mediated. Such transcriptions, in fact, might simply add to the 
complexity of the edition rather than reveal some truth about the originals. Howe seems, in this 
respect, as interested in the material circumstances of production as a textual scholar. 
 If “Foreword,” through its reflections on the treasured editions of Howe’s archive, primes 
us to think about the materialities of writing and of the text, so too do the word collages found in 
the later sections of Debths. Consider, for example, the two that appear on pages 48–49 (see 
figure 4). Thin streams of text—which Howe fashions from many diverse texts, their various 
typefaces, characters, and orientations clashing here—run through the centers of these pages. 
Nearly all of these streams remain illegible, except for two perched atop the others reading, 
“TANGIBLE THINGS.” The cut, copied, remixed, and reproduced qualities of these word 
collages call attention to the physical nature of both process and product. While writing always 
remains entangled with many materials, it seems doubly so for Howe and the wide spectrum of 
technologies used to produce these compositions. Similarly, while the text always remains a 
material entity, Debths employs “a strong visual component” that reminds us that it can never 
become something immaterial. The legibility here of “TANGIBLE THINGS,” though, 
intensifies these sentiments. Another example, from page 80, calls further attention to the 
materiality of writing and of the text while alluding to Howe’s earlier discussion of editions (see 
figure 5). A smaller word collage sits in the center of the page here, consisting of three different 
texts overlapping each other at odd angles. Unlike the “TANGIBLE THINGS” example above, 
most of the words (even those with strikethroughs) remain legible. Indeed, the collage begins 
clearly with “Coleridge”—the allusion to the Romantic poet evoking Howe’s enjoyment of 
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editions featuring manuscripts of poetry with strong visual components.6 Towards the bottom of 
this collage, meanwhile, the partially occluded “Spinoza’s face in the title-page” reflects back on 
the earlier discussion of editions and once again emphasizes the material nature of the medium. 
Howe’s poetry, in this respect, never allows us to forget that it emerges and contains diverse 
materials. 
Even a puzzling fingerprint, appearing amidst these word collages, articulates this point. 
On page 58, it stands less than an inch from the left edge, vertically centered, partially occluded, 
and smudged (see figure 6). While it seems, at first glance, like an outlying feature of Debths, it 
nevertheless calls attention to the materiality of writing and of the text much like the prose and 
word collage examples above. The fingerprint, in fact, encourages us to envision the hands that 
crafted this edition. Working with various tools, they wrote Debths from and with everything 
from the Secret Languages of Ireland to a Canon copier. This fingerprint evokes a hand 
accidently left on the surface of a copier as it scanned another document. It also evokes our own 
hands, turning the pages, changing their orientations to read the clashing copy of the word 
collages, and ultimately imprinting them with our own smudged fingerprints. We register, in 
other words, the physicality of both process and product here. Instead of puzzling outlier, then, 
this fingerprint reminds us both that writing emerges from and that a text contains many 
materials. Just as her discussions of the Secret Languages of Ireland and New Poems: 
Manuscript Materials or her word collages attune us to the materialities at play here, so too does 
this fingerprint. It becomes, in this respect, another “strong visual component” that heightens our 
awareness of both the writing of Debths and Debths as a physical text. 
                                                      
6 Coleridge’s manuscripts, while not necessarily visually oriented, display a script handwriting that nevertheless 
make them visually interesting. See https://www.bl.uk/people/samuel-taylor-coleridge for examples. 
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Yet all of these features account for only one part of Howe’s double movement. 
Certainly, they all attune us to the materiality of writing and of the text, but that materializing 
tendency reinforces an implicit ontological claim in Debths about matter. That claim seems 
clearest in the second section of the edition, “Titian Air Vent,” where Howe suggests that 
temporal experience arises when human and nonhuman things coalesce into assemblages and 
thereby demonstrate and develop their vibrant qualities. This section, which takes its title from a 
room at the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston, features short blocks of verse that shift 
between the poet’s own sense of time and material things (“Inside and Underneath Words”). 
Already attuned to the materiality of writing and the text, we understand Howe’s vision of matter 
more clearly in these passages. Consider, for example, the following lines: 
I am here to slay the 
dragon in the ready-made name of an earlier Susan. While 
there is still time do you know anything about my watch 
being stopped? Put your hand over my eyes and say I have 
got it in my mind. 
 Ceramic, plaster, lacquer, newspaper (28) 
Howe seems preoccupied with time: she alludes to “an earlier Susan” and asks about her “watch 
being stopped.” The closing three lines, however, demonstrate how this sense of time arises from 
a grouping of disparate human and nonhuman things. Putting a hand “over [her] eyes” and 
saying that she has “it in [her] mind” both suggest a temporal experience mediated by such 
things. If the “it” refers to the stopped watch, then it, the hand, and the mind coalesce into an 
assemblage that prompts one to register time. Similarly, the closing line of “Ceramic, plaster, 
lacquer, newspaper” delves further into matter and thereby connects Howe’s sense of time here 
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with these things. This list, in fact, suggests that temporal experience not only occurs within but 
emerges from a materially rich context. 
 Other examples from “Titian Air Vent” demonstrate how matter mediates Howe’s sense 
of past, present, and future, though they proceed in different directions. Consider the following 
passage: 
Electric bulb 
It’s a manic condition; barbaric conceptions of an “other 
self” sawing away our finite future as we approach the 
laws which govern clutter; leaving at death to return no 
more although fitfully visiting old haunts with the aid of 
metal, clay, guache, glass, glue (30) 
The nonhuman things (“Electric bulb” and “metal, clay, guache, glass, glue”) that bookend this 
passage heighten our awareness of matter here. Thus, when Howe discusses “our finite future” or 
“fitfully visiting old haunts,” we sense that such temporal experiences do not arise solely from 
human cognition or perception but from human interaction with nonhuman entities. As we 
consider “our finite future,” in fact, “we approach the laws which govern clutter” further 
strengthening this connection. And, similarly, when “fitfully visiting old haunts” we do so “with 
the aid of metal, clay, guache, glass, glue.” For Howe, we register the past (the “old haunts”) not 
through ourselves alone but in conjunction with nonhuman things. 
 To conclude, I will return to a passage explored earlier, but in passing, in my discussion 
of Jane Bennett’s new materialism. It too occurs in “Titian Air Vent,” and it articulates both the 
connection between temporal experience and matter in Debths and Howe’s larger representation 
of matter itself: 
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Te turo turo 
Running footsteps. Interlete te interlute. Ages have passed. 
A bell of the Chou dynasty is in my hands. Goodbye for 
the present. I seem to go back to things that do not belong 
to me. Call when you get depressed. There are those of us 
at a distance who may have seemed to drop out of touch but 
never really did (35) 
Again, Howe seems preoccupied with temporal experience. The nonsense phrases of “Te turo 
turo” and “Interlete te interlute,” combined with the “Running footsteps,” give this passage a 
rhythm that marks time as we read. Meanwhile, when Howe declares “Ages have passed” or 
“Goodbye for the present” she, too, marks time both by demarcating the past and demonstrating 
how quickly the present passes into it. That past, in fact, intrigues her. She returns to “things that 
do not belong” to her; she remembers that those “who may have seemed to drop out of touch” 
remain and, in this respect, become markers of the past themselves. When Howe comments, 
however, that “A bell of the Chou dynasty is in my hands” she suggests that a confederation of 
human and nonhuman things engenders these temporal experiences. Indeed, the bell and the 
hands, joined together in this assemblage, demonstrate and develop a power that channels these 
experiences. Where the bell’s age—the Chou dynasty dates roughly from the 12th century to 3rd 
century B.C.E.—produces thoughts of the past, the hands holding the bell personalize those 
thoughts. Both exhibit some immanent power to engender a productive effect, then, but both 
exhibit this power through their relationship with each other. Human and nonhuman entities 
coalesce to reveal that matter remains vibrant regardless of how we categorize it. 
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By examining Howe’s efforts to foreground the materiality of her work, and by exploring 
the ontological claims made in that work, this thesis has used matter as its organizing principle. It 
thereby joins a growing chorus of contemporary critical voices that do the same across 
disciplines. Bill Brown has suggested that similar emphases on matter, things, and objects have 
not emerged in a vacuum. “It may be,” he writes, “that scholars have turned their attention to the 
object world because our most precious object, the earth, seems to be dying” (13). Steven 
Shaviro, meanwhile, has argued, “The universe of things is not just available to us but 
increasingly unavoidable. The volcano is actual, here and now; we cannot expect to escape its 
eruption” (43). Such apocalyptic language underscores the environmental crisis that climate 
change poses in the twenty-first century. A dying earth, an erupting volcano—the severity of 
these phrases forces us to contemplate the material reality of the world we inhabit. At the same 
time, however, this language reaffirms that we have always inhabited a world rich in matter 
despite our efforts to dematerialize it. Howe’s work always resists those efforts. That This and 
Debths demonstrate how seemingly simple acts—writing, reading, remembering—occur within 




Figure 1. One of six photograms by James Welling included in That This (page 38).  
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Figure 2. One of Howe’s word collages from That This (page 48). 
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Figure 3. Another of Howe’s word collages from That This (page 81). 
 
Figure 4. A two-page spread from Debths with “TANGIBLE THINGS” featured prominently in 
two of Howe’s word collages (pages 48–49). 
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